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Abstract
In this paper we propose a new family of matchingsas solution for the
roommate problem with strict preferences, when stable matchings may
not exist. To define these matchings we proceed as follows: We introduce
the solution of maximum irreversibility, a strong notion of stability, and
consider two other existing solutions that deal with unsolvable roommate
problems: the almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2]) and the
maximum stable matchings (Tan [31] [33]). Although each of these core
consistent solutions is a good candidate for solving roommate problems,
we find that it is not possible to reconcile almost stability with any of
the other two. Hence we select the family of matchings, the Q-stable
family, that lie in the intersection of the maximum irreversible matchings
and maximum stable matchings. Then we offer an efficient algorithm to
compute a member of this family: a Q∗-stable matching.
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1 Introduction
Gale and Shapley [13] introduce one-to-one matching problems. They first de-
fine, the marriage problem, a two-sided matching problem in which agents are
divided in two disjoint groups and an agent can only be matched to an agent
in the other group. Then, they proceed with the roommate problem, a one-
sided matching problem in which all agents belong to a unique group and every
agent can be matched to any other. The authors propose stable matchings as
solution for those problems. A matching is stable if no two agents prefer one
another to their current partners. They show that for the marriage problem a
stable matching always exists, while this could not be true for the roommate
problem. The following example, slightly modified from the original one in Gale
and Shapley [13], illustrates this case.
Example 1 Consider the following 4-agent problem:
a1 a2 a3 a4
a2 a3 a1 a1
a3 a1 a2 a2
a4 a4 a4 a3
a1 a2 a3 a4
To see that no stable matching exists, suppose that one of the first three agents,
say agent a3, is either unmatched or matched to agent a4. Then, agents a2 and
a3 form a blocking pair. Similar arguments can be applied to agents a1 and a2.
In the last decades an extensive literature on one-to-one matching problems
has emerged both in Economics and in Computer Science. However, most works
focus on the marriage problem while the roommate problem has been much less
studied. This can be explained by two reasons: First, a greater number of
economic issues can be modeled as a two-sided problem than as a one-sided
one. Second, the impossibility of finding a stable matching and the more com-
plex structure of the roommate problem may have discouraged researchers from
analyzing it.
Pairing policemen to patrol, pilots to flight (see Cechla´rova´ and Ferkova´
[8]), students to share double rooms in colleges or marriages between agents
of the same-sex are significant problems to be analyzed. In sport competitions
the manner in which agents are paired in teams of two players, such as double
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tennis or paddle, may affect the final result. The kidney exchange problem
has been modeled as a roommate problem (see Irving [28]). Furthermore there
are centrally coordinated programs such as the odd shoe exchanges,1 holidays
homes exchanges,2 and centralized pairing methods used in chess competitions
(see Kujansuu et al. [22]), which also suggest potential applications of the
roommate problem. Moreover, as Klaus et al. [21] point out, the roommate
problem has interest in itself since it boils down into hedonic coalition formation
(see Bogomolnaia and Jackson [6]) and network formation problems (see Jackson
and Watts [18]).
In the scarce literature about one-sided matching problems a common prac-
tice is to restrict the analysis to those problems in which a stable matching exists
(solvable problems) (see for instance, Gusfield and Irving [15], Chung [9], Dia-
mantoudi et al. [11], Klaus and Klijn [20] and Gudmundsson [14]). However,
restricting the attention to solvable roommate problems ignores a significant
subclass of problems without stable matchings (unsolvable problems). This fact
has been corroborated by Pittel and Irving [26] who observe that as the number
of agents increases the probability of a roommate problem being unsolvable also
increases fairly steeply.
The aim of the current paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate
problems with strict preferences.3 Indeed it is essential to require a solution
which provides a stable matching when dealing with solvable problems and
some matching otherwise. Hence we focus on core consistent solutions4. At
the interface between Economics and Computer Sciences several solutions have
been proposed explicitly for unsolvable problems, but still there is a pending
discussion in depth regarding comparison between solutions as well as scope for
a new one.
Two interesting solutions have been analyzed in the literature for unsolvable
problems: The almost stable matchings, proposed by Abraham et al. [2], form
a subclass of Pareto-optimal matchings with the minimum number of blocking
pairs.5 The notion of maximum internal stability introduced by Tan [31], single
1http://www.oddshoe.org/
2http://www.exchangeholidayhomes.com/
3Except for small number of references, we have deliberately avoided the analysis of a
variety of roommate problem reappraisals.
4Other solutions have been proposed in the literature, for instance popular matching.
However, this solution is not core-consistent and for that reason we have ruled it out from our
analysis. For more details in such a solution see Biro et al. [5].
5See Biermann [3] for a critical evaluation of this criterion in the marriage problem.
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out matchings with the largest set of pairs that are stable among them. However,
the following basic proposal has been overlooked. Consider the case in which two
agents are top choice for each other. Once this pair is formed it never splits. A
less extreme case is the existence of a set of agents forming a pairing so strongly
stable that they are stably paired within them and none of them prefers an agent
outside to her current partner no matter how the outside agents are matched.
Hence, once these pairs are formed they never break. Thus, we believe that a
maximum irreversible set of pairs should form part of the matching selected to
solve any roommate problem.
Certainly each of the three mentioned solutions show sufficient grounds to be
considered as a good candidate for solving roommate problems. Then it makes
sense to consider to make a proposal that could conciliate most if not all of the
mentioned solutions.
From the study of the relationship between these solutions we find that the
almost stable solution is incompatible with the other two. Moreover it happens
that the problem of finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking
pairs is NP-hard. Hence, our next step (move) is to search a solution that
it could conciliate the notions of maximum internally stability and maximum
irreversibility. Thus, we select the set of matchings that lie in the intersection
of the two solutions and refer to as the Q-stable matchings. Since our late
motive is the selection of a single matching to solve the roommate problem, an
essential criterion to take into account is the possibility of determining one of
those matchings. We offer an efficient algorithm to compute such a matching.
Finally, let us extend what we have learnt from two-sided matching problems
to one-sided matching problems. In two-sided matching problems if agents
interact freely, and after a match they decide systematically what to do next
then they eventually reach a stable matching. It is also known that market
frictions may prevent to obtain a stable matching.6 This justifies the presence
of clearinghouses7 to which agents submit preference lists to a policy maker
who, following a procedure, implements the desired matching. Similarly in
one-sided matchings it is important to identify some matching resulting from a
decentralized process. For the roommate problem it is known that the blocking
6A well-known documented episode of unraveling in matching markets for medical interns
shows that contracts for interns were signed two years earlier than students’ graduation (see,
for instance, Echenique and Pereyra [12] and the references therein).
7For instance, the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) matches physicians and
residency programs in the United States.
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dynamic between agents leads to an absorbing set of matchings (see Inarra et
al. [17] and Klaus et al. [21] ). In fact, once one of these matchings has been
reached, the blocking dynamic of the agents does not allow to abandon that
set. Hence, we proceed studying whether our proposal is one of the elements
of an absorbing set. We find that, although not all Q-stable matchings belong
to an absorbing set the matching determined by the algorithm does. Therefore
we are providing to policy makers with a procedure that implements a Q-stable
matching for solving roommate problems.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the preliminaries of the
paper. In Section 3 we present and discuss the notion of maximum irreversibil-
ity and the other two solutions existent in the literature for the unsolvable
roommate problem, and we proceed with the comparison of these three core
consistent solutions. In Section 4 we introduce the Q-stable matchings and an
algorithm to compute one of them. We also show that such a matching belongs
to an absorbing set. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
In a roommate problem , a finite set of agents N = {a1, . . . , an} has to be
partitioned into pairs and singletons. Each agent has strict preference over
potential roommates with the possibility of having a room for herself/himself.
Formally, a roommate problem, or a problem for short is a pair (N, (ai)ai∈N )
(or (N,) for short) where N is a finite set of agents and for each agent ai ∈ N ,
ai is a complete, transitive preference relation defined over N . Preferences are
strict, i.e., ak ai aj and aj ai ak if and only if aj = ak. The strict preference
relation associated with ai is denoted by ai . Agent aj is acceptable for agent
ai if aj ai ai. Otherwise it is said to be unacceptable. A solution to a problem,
a matching, is a function µ : N → N such that if µ(ai) = aj then µ(aj) = ai.
Thus, a matching is a set of disjoint pairs and singletons formed by the agents
in N . Let µ(ai) denotes agent’s ai partner at matching µ. If µ(ai) = ai, then
agent ai is unmatched in µ. A matching µ with all its agents paired is called
complete. Given S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, let µ(S) = {µ(ai) : ai ∈ S}. That is, µ(S)
is the set of partners of the agents in S under matching µ. Let µ |S denotes
the restriction of µ to agents in S. If µ(S) = S, then µ |S is a matching in
(S, (ai)ai∈S).
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A matching µ is blocked by a pair {ai, aj} ⊆ N if aj ai µ(ai) and ai aj
µ(aj), that is ai and aj prefer each other to her current partner (if any) in
µ. If pair {ai, aj} blocks matching µ then {ai, aj} is called a blocking pair of
µ. Let {ai, aj} blocks a matching µ. A matching µ′ is obtained from µ by
satisfying {ai, aj} if µ′(ai) = aj , their partners (if any) under µ are alone in µ′,
and the remaining agents are matched as in µ. A matching without blocking
pairs is called a stable matching. A problem is called solvable if the set of stable
matchings is non-empty and unsolvable otherwise.
We extend each agent’s preferences over her potential partners to the set of
matchings in the following way: We say that agent ai prefers µ
′ to µ, and denote
it by µ′ i µ if and only if agent ai prefers her partner at µ′ to her partner
at µ, µ′(ai) ai µ(ai). (We say that agent ai is indifferent between matchings
µ′ and µ, denoted by µ′ ∼ai µ if she is matched to the same partner in both
matchings).
Stable partitions
Tan [32] establishes the necessary and sufficient condition for the solvability of
a problem with strict preferences using the notion of stable partition. Formally
the notion of stable partition is formally defined as follows:
Let A = {a1, ..., ak} ⊆ N be an ordered set of agents. The set A is a ring
if k ≥ 3 and for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}, ai+1 ai ai−1 ai ai (subscript modulo k).
The set A is a pair of mutually acceptable agents if k = 2 and for all i ∈ {1, 2},
ai−1 ai ai (subscript modulo 2). The set A is a singleton if k = 1.
A stable partition is a partition P of N such that:
(i) For all A ∈ P, the set A is a ring, a pair of mutually acceptable agents or a
singleton, and
(ii) For all A,B ∈ P where A = {a1, ..., ak} and B = {b1, ..., bl} (possibly
A = B), the following condition holds:
if bj ai ai−1 then bj−1 bj ai,
for all i ∈ {1, ..., k} and j ∈ {1, ..., l} such that bj 6= ai+1.
Thus, a stable partition is a partition of the set of agents such that each set
in a stable partition is either a ring, a pair of mutually acceptable individuals,
or a singleton, and the partition satisfies the (usual) stability condition between
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any two sets and also within each set.8 The following assertions are proven by
Tan [32].
Remark 1 (i) A problem (N,) has no stable matchings if and only if there
exists a stable partition with an odd ring. (ii) All stable partitions have exactly
the same odd rings and singletons. (iii) All even rings in a stable partition can
be broken into pairs of mutually acceptable agents while preserving stability.
Without loss of generality hereafter we suppose that the even parties are
always pairs in any stable partition we are working with.
Since stable partition plays a significant role in the present work and his
interpretation is not that easy, in the appendix we introduce informally the
algorithm introduced by Tan and Hsueh [34], and illustrate it with a numerical
example which we believe it clarifies its meaning.
3 Core consistent solutions
In this section we first introduce a notion of strong stability that we believe is
appropriate to be considered in the search of a matching as stable as possible.
Then we consider two existing solutions proposed for unsolvable problems.
3.1 Maximum irreversibility
Consider the case in which two agents are top choice for each other. Once
this pair is formed it never splits.9 A less extreme case is the existence of a
set of agents forming a pairing so strongly stable that they are stably paired
within them and none of them prefers an agent outside to her current partner
no matter how the outside agents are matched. Therefore, once these pairs are
formed they never break. We call this set of pairs ‘ irreversible”.
A problem may have matchings with different irreversible sets but it seems
natural to require that some of the largest ones is contained into the proposed
matching. Formally,
Definition 1 (i) A set of agents S ⊆ N form an irreversible set of pairs µS if
there is no pair {ai, aj} (possibly ai = aj) such that {ai, aj} ∩ S 6= ∅ such that
8Stable partitions are also called stable half-matchings in some recent papers, such as
Biro´ et al. [4]. A half-matching is a well- known notion in graph theory that also helps to
understand the meaning of this notion.
9This property, called ‘mutually best” property was introduced by Toda [35] for the mar-
riage problem and by Can and Klaus [7] for the roommate problem.
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{ai, aj} blocks µS. (ii) Matching µ is maximum irreversible if it contains the
largest irreversible set of pairs.
The set of maximum irreversible matchings is core-consistent and the larger
the set of irreversible pairs is, the more selective this criterion will be. To see
the robustness of this solution consider the following example:
Example 2 Consider the following 10-agent problem:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10
a2 a3 a1 a8 a9 a4 a6 a5 a7 a1
a3 a1 a2 a9 a1 a5 a8 a7 a4 a2
a4 a10 a4 a3 a6 a7 a9 a4 a5 a3
a6 a5 a5 a6 a8 a8 a5 a6 a1 a4
a5 a6 a6 a7 a7 a9 a1 a1 a2 a5
a7 a7 a7 a10 a4 a2 a2 a2 a3 a6
a8 a8 a8 a1 a2 a3 a3 a9 a6 a7
a9 a4 a9 a2 a3 a1 a4 a1 a8 a8
a10 a9 a10 a5 a10 a10 a10 a3 a10 a9
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10
Matching µ1 = {{a1, a2}, {a3}, {a4, a8}, {a5, a9}{a7, a6}, {a10}} is maximum ir-
reversible, with an irreversible set of three pairs. The pairing {{a4, a8}, {a5, a9}{a7, a6}}
is stable and no agent in it prefers any other agent outside to her current part-
ner. Hence, once this pairing is formed these pairs keep together.
However, for unsolvable problems the set of irreversible pairs of a problem
might be empty. Hence, this criterion by itself might be indefinite. In what
follows, we present two core consistent solutions that have been proposed in the
literature.
3.2 Two known solutions
In this subsection we present two core consistent solutions that deal explicitly
with unsolvable problems: almost stable matchings and the maximum internally
stable matchings.
Almost stability
Pareto optimality, one of the most relevant criterion in Economics, has also been
applied to the roommate problem and to a variety of its extensions.10 In our
10Sotomayor [30] studies Pareto optimality in the roommate problem with indifferences.
O¨zkal-Sanver [25] establishes some impossibility results for roommate problems which includes
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setup it can be defined as follows:
Definition 2 A matching µ is Pareto optimal if there does not exist a matching
µ′ such that µ′(ai) ai µ(ai) for all ai ∈ N and µ′(ai) ai µ(ai) for some
ai ∈ N .
There is no doubt that Pareto optimality is an appealing criterion related to
stability. A stable matching is Pareto-optimal (see Proposition 5 in Abraham
and Manlowe [1]) and a non-Pareto optimal matching is always unstable. This is
because it is blocked by a set of agents who are better off in another matching.11
However, Pareto optimality by itself is not a convincing criterion for selecting
matchings in the roommate problem for two reasons. On the one hand, it
requires that when any two agents block a matching by forming a new pair
their partners, if any, must not get worse in the new matching. In our setting,
however, it is enough that two agents improve forming a blocking pair, without
considering the well being of their abandoned partners in the new matching
formed.12 On the other hand, it can select too many matchings: For solvable
problems, the Pareto-optimal solution is core inclusive, that is, it selects all
stable matchings and some unstable ones. For unsolvable problems, it suffers
from a similar drawback; it can select matchings differing on the number of
blocking pairs.
The idea of refining the set of Pareto optimal matchings was undertaken by
Abraham and Manlove [1] who prove the following assertions:
Remark 2 Let bp(µ) denote the set of blocking pairs of matching µ, that is
bp(µ) = {{ai, aj} ⊆ N : {ai, aj} blocks µ} (i) If matching µ Pareto dominates
matching µ′ then bp(µ) ⊂ bp(µ′) (ii) If µ is a matching with the fewest number
of blocking pairs of a problem then µ is Pareto optimal.
Following the idea behind the previous results, Abraham et al. [2] study
matchings with the fewest number of blocking pairs and call them almost stable
matchings. Formally,
Definition 3 A matching µ is almost stable if |bp(µ)| ≤ |bp(µ′)| for all µ′ 6= µ,
where |bp(µ)| denotes the number of blocking pairs of matching µ.
Pareto optimality as an axiom.
11If a matching is not Pareto optimal then it admits an improving coalition (see Proposition
6.24 in Manlove [23]) See Chapter 6 in this book for a survey on Pareto optimal matchings.
12This is not the case in problems in which bilateral approval is required to dissolve part-
nership see Morrill [24].
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Maximum internal stability
A matching µ is maximum stable if it excludes the minimum number of agents
such that the non excluded ones form a complete stable matching see Tan [31]
[33]. For computing a maximum stable matching, given a stable partition Tan
[31] proposes to delete one agent from each odd ring of the partition as well
as all singletons. Then he defines the problem restricted to the set of non-
deleted agents, keeping their original preferences over them. This new problem
is solvable and the computation of a stable matching gives a maximum stable
matching.
Example 2 (cont.) In this problem, P = {{a1, a2, a3}, {a4, a6}, {a5, a8}, {a7, a9}, {a10}}
is a stable partition and all maximum stable matchings have four stable pairs.
Matching µ1 ⊇ {{a2, a3}, {a4, a6}, {a5, a8}, {a7, a9}} is maximum stable and it
can be derived from Tan’s proposal by isolating one agent from the odd ring,
agent a2, and the singleton, agent a10. Apart from the maximum stable match-
ings obtained in this manner there may be others. For instance, µ2 ⊇ {{a2, a10}, {a4, a6}, {a5, a8}, {a7, a9}}
which is also maximum stable.
Tan’s solution is applied to a setting in which a matching is defined as a
set of pairs while isolated agents never form part of that matching. To adapt
Tan’s definition of a maximum stable matching to our setup, where a matching
is a set of disjoint pairs and singletons formed by all the agents of a given set
N , we must add to the maximum stable matching the deleted agents, so that
all agents in the problem form part of that matching. One possibility is to
consider the matching in which agents that are not paired in a stable manner
are singletons. Another possibility is to matched some (or all) the singletons
forming pairs among them. All these matchings are equally close to stability in
the sense that they contain the same number of stable pairs. Hence the idea of
maximum stability in our setting can be define as follows:
Definition 4 (i) A set of agents T ⊆ N form an internally stable set of pairs
µT if there is no pair {ai, aj} ⊆ T such that {ai, aj} blocks µT . (ii) Matching
µ is maximum internally stable if it contains the largest number of pairs which
are internally stable.
Example 2 (cont.) Matching µ = {{a1, a3}, {a2}, {a4, a6}, {a5, a8}, {a7, a9}, {a10}}
is maximum stable and internally stable, while matching µ′ = {{a1, a3}, {a2, a10}, {a4, a6}, {a5, a8}, {a7, a9}}
is maximum internally stable but not maximum stable.
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Considering the notion of stable partition, say P, introduced above, Inarra et
al. [16] define matchings associated to that partition, called P-stable matchings.
These matchings are formally defined as follows:
Let P be a stable partition. A P-stable matching is a matching such that for
each set A = {a1, ..., ak} ∈ P, agent ai is paired with either ai+1 or ai−1 for all
i ∈ {1, ..., k} except for a unique agent j who remains unmatched if A is odd or
a singleton.13 Hence, for each odd ring one agent is left out, and the rest of the
agents of the ring are matched following its order, that is, they are matched to his
subsequent or preceding agent. The reader may have noticed some similarities
between P-stable matchings and maximum internally stable matchings defined
above. It turns out that the set of P-stable matchings coincides with the set of
maximum internally stable matchings that can be computed by Tan’s algorithm.
Remark 3 A P-stable matching is maximum internally stable.
The following result states some features of the P-stable matchings obtained
from the same stable partition P.
Given two matchings µ and µ′, we denote µ′RM if and only if µ′ is obtained
from µ by satisfying a blocking pair of µ (direct domination). We denote µ′RTµ
if and only if there is a sequence of matchings µ = µ1, . . . , µk = µ
′ such that for
all l ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1} µl+1 is obtained from µl by satisfying a blocking pair of µl
(indirect domination).
Remark 4 Let M be the set of all matchings and let P be a stable partition.
Consider M|P = {µ ∈ M : µ is a P-stable matching of P}. Then (i) For any
µ, µ′ ∈ M|P , µRTµ′. (ii) For all ai ∈ N belonging to an odd ring of P, there
exists a matching µ ∈M|P such that µ(ai) = ai.
As we shall see the P-stable matchings play a significant role in Section 4.
3.3 Incompatibilities between solutions
In this subsection our purpose is to analyze if there exists a solution that could
conciliate all the solutions presented above. Unfortunately we find that this
is not possible. In what follows we show that the solution of almost stable
matchings is incompatible with each of the other two solutions.
13Inarra et al. [16] show that from any matching there exists a sequence of blocking pairs
reaching a P-stable matching. See Roth and Vande Vate [27] and Diamantoudi et al. [11] for
similar approaches to convergence to stability.
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To prove the incompatibility between almost stable matchings and maximum
internally stable matchings, we start showing the incompatibility between the
latter and the family of Pareto optimal matchings in the following example.
Example 3 Consider the following 8-agent problem:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
a2 a3 a1 a1 a1 a7 a8 a6
a3 a1 a2 a2 a2 a8 a6 a7
a4 a4 a4 a3 a3 a4 a4 a4
a5 a5 a5 a6 a6 a5 a5 a5
a6 a6 a6 a7 a7 a1 a1 a1
a7 a7 a7 a8 a8 a2 a2 a2
a8 a8 a8 a5 a4 a3 a3 a3
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
This example has a unique stable partition P = {{a1, a2, a3}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a7, a8}}
with two odd rings {a1, a2, a3} and {a6, a7, a8}. Every maximum internally sta-
ble matching has three stable pairs: one pair from each odd ring and the pair
{a4, a5}. First, note that those matchings with singletons are not Pareto opti-
mal since any other matching that joins them will Pareto dominate the original
one. Hence we restrict our attention to those maximum internally stable match-
ings without singletons. There are nine of those matchings with three stable pairs
each: µ1 = {{a1, a2}, {a3, a6}, {a4, a5}, {a7, a8}}; µ2 = {{a1, a2}, {a3, a7}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a8}};
µ3 = {{a1, a2}, {a3, a8}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a7}}; µ4 = {{a1, a3}, {a2, a6}, {a4, a5}, {a7, a8}};
µ5 = {{a1, a3}, {a2, a7}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a8}}; µ6 = {{a1, a3}, {a2, a8}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a7}};
µ7 = {{a1, a6}, {a2, a3}, {a4, a5}, {a7, a8}}; µ8 = {{a1, a7}, {a2, a3}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a8}};
µ9 = {{a1, a8}, {a2, a3}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a8}}. None of these matchings are Pareto-
optimal since in each of them agents in the pair {a4, a5} and agents in the
pair coming from different odd rings can improve by rearranging their partners.
Hence the following proposition can be established.
Proposition 1 The intersection of Pareto-optimal matchings and maximum
internally stable matchings may be empty.
Since almost stable matchings are Pareto optimal the following corollary can
be established.
Corollary 2 The set of maximum internally matchings and the set of almost-
stable matchings may have an empty intersection.
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This implies that the idea of finding a matching with the fewest number
of blocking pairs is conflicting with the idea of finding a matching with the
maximum number of stable pairs. In fact the example shows the well known
trade off between Pareto optimality and stability.
Next, the incompatibility between almost stability and maximum irreversibil-
ity is shown in the following example.
Example 4 Consider the following 8-agent problem:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
a2 a3 a4 a5 a4 a5 a8 a6
a3 a1 a1 a3 a6 a7 a6 a7
a8 a4 a2 a1 a3 a8 a4 a1
a5 a5 a5 a6 a2 a4 a5 a5
a4 a6 a6 a7 a7 a1 a1 a4
a7 a7 a7 a8 a8 a2 a2 a2
a6 a8 a8 a2 a1 a3 a3 a3
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
Matching µ = {{a1, a2}, {a3, a4}, {a5, a6}, {a7, a8}} is the only one that is al-
most stable, being {a4, a5} its unique blocking pair. However, pair {a4, a5} is
the maximum irreversible set and it is not contained in matching µ. Hence the
following proposition can be established.
Proposition 3 The intersection of almost stable matchings and maximum ir-
reversible matchings may be empty.
Therefore almost stable matchings are incompatible with the other two solu-
tions. Moreover Abraham et al. [2] show that the problem of finding a matching
with the minimum number of blocking pairs is NP-hard and even hard to ap-
proximate. These results suggest to make a proposal for the roommate problem
by conciliating maximum internally stable and maximum irreversible matchings.
4 Q-stable matchings
Given the incompatibility between almost stable matchings and the other two so-
lutions demostrated in the previous section, a natural question to ask is whether
the intersection of the other two solutions is non-empty and the answer is in the
affirmative. Matchings lying in the intersection are called Q-stable matchings
and are analyzed in this section.
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Definition 5 A matching is Q-stable if it is maximum internally stable, and
maximum irreversible.
As we have mentioned in the introduction our aim in this paper is to provide
to the policy maker with a procedure to compute a Q-stable matching. In what
follows we introduce an algorithm that does this job efficiently. The algorithm
starts with a stable partition of a roommate problem and, by means of an
iterative process, it removes from the preference lists those agents unable to form
irreversible pairs. Then a stable partition with a maximum set of irreversible
pairs is derived from which a Q-stable matching is finally obtained.
To proceed some additional notation is needed.
Given a stable partition Pt. Let Dt be the set formed by the agents in the
odd sets of Pt, i.e. odd rings or singletons. Let St be the set of agents in pairs
so that N = Dt ∪ St. Let Pt|St the set of pairs of partition Pt. Notice that
Pt|St is a stable pairing of the agents in St.
The algorithm
Stage 1: Finding a maximum irreversible set of pairs
Step 1. Let (N1, (R1ai )i∈N1) be a problem where N1 = N and (R1ai ) = (ai).
Compute a stable partition P1 for (N1, (R1ai )ai∈N1).14
Let N1 = D1 ∪ S1. If S1 = ∅ then STOP and set µI = P1|S1 = ∅. If
S1 = N1 then STOP and set µI = P1|S1 . Otherwise, for every agent
ai ∈ S1 remove from (R1ai ) every agent ak ∈ D1 and every agent aj ∈ S1,
aj 6= ai, such that ak ai aj (ai prefers ak to aj) for some ak ∈ D1. Go
to next step.
Step t. Define a reduced problem (Nt, (Rtai )ai∈Nt) where Nt = St−1 and (Rtai )
is agent ai’s preference list after the clearing process over (Rt−1ai ). If no
agent is removed from agent ai’s preference list, set (Rtai ) = (
Rt−1
ai ).
Compute a stable partition Pt for (Nt, (Rtai )ai∈Nt) where Nt = St−1.
Let Nt = Dt∪St. If St = ∅ then STOP and set µI = Pt|St = ∅. If St = Nt
then STOP and set µI = Pt|St . Otherwise, for every agent ai ∈ St remove
from (Rtai ) every agent ak ∈ Dt and every agent aj ∈ St aj 6= ai, such
14An algorithm which computes a stable partition in linear time can be found in Tan [32].
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that ak ai aj (ai prefers ak to aj) for some ak ∈ Dt. Increase t and
repeat this step.
Stage 2: Build a stable partition for (N,).
Let I denote the set of matched agents in µI and let D denote the remaining
agents. Join P1 |D with µI to determine a stable partition P∗ on N . That is,
P∗ = P1 |D ∪µI .
Stage 3: Build a matching from stable partition P∗
From stable partition P∗ derive a P∗-stable matching. This matching is called
Q∗-stable.
If the problem is solvable then the output of the algorithm is a stable match-
ing and therefore it is immediate that it is maximum internally stable and max-
imum irreversible. That is,
Remark 5 A stable matching is a Q∗-stable.
The previous remark allows us to focus on unsolvable problems. Hence from
now on, we present some claims to prove that the algoritm provides a Q∗-stable
matching.
First, we present some claims, which are needed to show that the algorithm
provides a matching with a set of irreversible pairs of maximum size.
Claim 1 Suppose that µI is an irreversible set of pairs formed by a subset
of agents I ⊆ N and P |D is a stable partition for the problem restricted to
D = N\I. Then P = P |D ∪µI is a stable partition on N .
Proof. No pair {ai, aj} ⊆ I can block15 P by the stability of µI , no pair
{ai, aj} ⊆ D can block by the stability of P |D, and no pair {ai, aj} with ai ∈ I
and aj ∈ D can block by the irreversibility of µI .
Claim 2 If agent ai either belongs to an odd ring or she is a singleton in a
stable partition P then she can never be part of an irreversible set of pairs.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that ai is part of an irreversible matching
µI . Then, by Claim 1, µI could be extended to a stable partition P ′ = PN\I∪µI .
But then the set of odd rings and singletons would not be the same in P and
P ′, contradicting Remark (ii) 1.
15Abusing of language we say that a pair of agents {ai, bj} block partition P if bj ai ai−1
then bj−1 bj ai.
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Claim 3 The set of pairs µI derived in Stage 1 of the algorithm, is maximum
irreversible.
Proof. µI is irreversible by construction since there is no agent ai ∈ I such
that ai prefers an agent ak outside I to her current partner. It remains to prove
the maximality of µI . That is, if there exists another irreversible set of pairs
µI′ with I
′ ⊆ N , then I ′ ⊆ I. By contradiction, suppose that there exists µI′
such that I ′ \ I 6= ∅. Then there is an agent ai ∈ I ′ (ai /∈ I) who, by Claim 2, is
part of some pair in any stable partition. This agent is removed at some step t
of Stage 1 of the algorithm, and that implies the existence of an agent aj ∈ Dt
such that aj ai µI′(aj), contradicting that µI′ is irreversible.
The previous claim and the argument in its proof imply the following corol-
lary.16
Corollary 4 For a roommate problem the set of agents matched in the largest
irreversible set of pairs are the same.
Matching Q∗-stable matching is maximum irreversible by Claim 3 and max-
imum internally stable by Remark 3 then the following theorem can be estab-
lished.
Theorem 5 There always exists a Q∗-stable matching for any roommate prob-
lem.
Regarding the complexity of the algorithm the following result is established.
Proposition 6 A Q∗-stable matching can be computed in O(mn) time, where
n is the number of agents and m is the total length of the preference lists.
Proof. Stage 1 can be invoked at most n times since the set of agents in pairs
in the initial partition P1 can only shrink, and it is stopped when it does not
shrink. The execution of each step takes linear time in m, which is the total
length of the preference lists, since a stable partition can be found with Tan’s
algorithm [32] in O(m) time, and the clearing process in Stage 1 can also be
16This corollary is closely related to Proposition 3 in Inarra et al. [17] although they are
proven in different manners.
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conducted in linear time. Therefore the algorithm terminates in O(mn) time.17
Let us illustrate the algorithm and the previous results with an example:
Example 5 Consider the following 10-agents problem:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12
a2 a3 a1 a3 a4 a7 a5 a9 a10 a11 a8 a1
a3 a1 a2 a5 a6 a5 a6 a4 a8 a9 a10 a2
a4 a6 a4 a6 a7 a1 a1 a5 a1 a4 a1 a3
a5 a4 a5 a2 a1 a9 a2 a11 a6 a5 a2 a4
a6 a5 a6 a1 a2 a2 a3 a1 a3 a1 a3 a5
a7 a7 a7 a8 a3 a3 a4 a2 a4 a2 a4 a6
a8 a8 a8 a7 a8 a8 a8 a3 a5 a3 a5 a7
a9 a9 a9 a9 a9 a4 a9 a6 a7 a6 a6 a8
a10 a10 a10 a10 a10 a10 a10 a7 a2 a7 a7 a9
a11 a11 a11 a11 a11 a11 a11 a10 a11 a8 a9 a10
a12 a12 a12 a12 a12 a12 a12 a12 a12 a12 a12 a11
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12
Stage 1: Finding a maximum irreversible set of pairs
Step 1 Computing a stable partition for the problem (N1, (R1)ai∈N1), P1 =
{{a1, a2, a3}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a7}, {a8, a11}, {a9, a10}, {a12}} is obtained, where
D1 = {a1, a2, a3, a12} and S1 = {a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9, a10, a11}. Remove
from the list of preferences of each agent in S1 all agents in D1 and those
that are less preferred, except for herself.
Step 2 A reduced problem (N2, (R2)i∈N2), is defined where S1 = N2 :
a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11
a4 a4 a7 a5 a9 a10 a11 a8
a6 a5 a6 a4 a8 a9 a10
a7 a6 a7 a5 a9 a4 a11
a5 a11 a5
a8 a10
17Tan and Hsueh [34] propose another algorithm, which constructs a stable partition incre-
mentaly and whose complexity is O(n3) where n is the number of agents. This algorithm can
be seen as a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate [27] procedure of convergence to a stable
marriage.
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Computing a stable partition for this reduced problem, P2 = {{a4}, {a5, a6, a7}, {a8, a11}, {a9, a10}}
is obtained, where D2 = {a4, a5, a6, a7} and S2 = {a8, a9, a10, a11}. Re-
move from the list of preferences of each agent in S2 all agents in D2 and
those that are less preferred, except for herself.
Step 3 A reduced problem (N3, (R3)i∈N3) is defined where S2 = N3 :
a8 a9 a10 a11
a9 a10 a11 a8
a8 a8 a9 a10
a9 a10 a11
Computing a stable partition for the previous reduced problem P3 = {{a8, a9}, {a10, a11}}
is obtained, where D3 = ∅ and S3 = {a8, a9, a10, a11}. Since S3 = N3
STOP. Set µI = {{a8, a9}, {a10, a11}}.
Stage 2: Let I = {a8, a9, a10, a11} and D = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a12}. The
following stable partition P∗ = P1 |D ∪µI = {{a1, a2, a3}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a7}, {a8, a9}, {a10, a11}, {a12}}
is determined.
Stage 3: From P∗-stable partition let agent a1 to be left out from the ring while
agents a2 and a3 are matched preserving the ring ordering and the remaining
agents are matched as in P∗. The resulting matching {{a1}, {a2, a3}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a7}, {a8, a9}, {a10, a11}, {a12}}
is a Q∗-stable matching.
Note that we have started with partition P1 = {{a1, a2, a3}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a7}, {a8, a11}, {a9, a10}, {a12}}
and have found that the P1-stable matching derived from it is not maximum irre-
versible. With the algorithm partition P∗ = {{a1, a2, a3}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a7}, {a8, a9}, {a10, a11}, {a12}}
is reached and a Q∗-stable matching {{a1}, {a2, a3}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a7}, {a8, a9}, {a10, a11}, {a12}}
is obtained given that it is maximum internal stable and it contains the maxi-
mum irreversible set of pairs {{a8, a9}, {a10, a11}}.
Until now we have overlooked the importance of maximizing the number
of pairs matched in a matching. However, in many applications an essential
objective is to match as many agents as possible. Think for example on the
problem of dividing agents in a fixed number of two-person rooms or on the
kidney exchange problem.18 In those cases we can join the single agents of the
18For more details see the survey on market design for kidney exchange by So¨nmez and
U¨nver [29].
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Q∗-stable matching outcome of the algorithm. In the example above matching
{{a1, a12}, {a2, a3}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a7}, {a8, a9}, {a10, a11}} is obtained.
Remark 6 Every matching formed by joining mutually acceptable unmatched
agents from a Q∗-stable matching is also a Q∗-stable matching.
We have given an algorithm to compute a matching which lies in the inter-
section of the set of maximum internal stable matchings and the set of maxi-
mum irreversible stable matchings. It can be checked that these two solutions
do not contain each other. In Example 6, P1-stable matching is maximum
internally stable and not maximum irreversible while, for instance, matching
{{a1}, {a2}, {a3}, {a4, a5}, {a6, a7}, {a8, a9}, {a10, a11}, {a12}} is maximum irre-
versible and not maximum internally stable.
4.1 Q-stable matchings and absorbing sets
For the roommate problem Inarra et al. [17] study to which matchings a de-
centralized process may lead to. They consider a dynamic process in which a
matching is adjusted when a blocking pair of agents mutually decide to become
partners. Either this change gives a stable matching or a new blocking pair of
agents will generate another matching and so on. If there are stable matchings
the process eventually converges to one of them. Otherwise it will lead to a
set of matchings (an absorbing set) such that any matching in the set can be
obtained from any other and it is impossible to escape from the matchings in
that set.19 As we have mentioned in the introduction it is important to inves-
tigate whether our proposal, the Q∗-stable matching, is achievable from a free
interactions of agents. That is, whether it belongs to an absorbing set, task that
we undertake in this subsection.
A non-empty set of matchings A is an absorbing set if the following condi-
tions hold: (i) For all µ, µ′ ∈ A (µ 6= µ′), µ′RTµ. (ii) For all µ ∈ A there is no
µ′ /∈ A such that µ′RM .
Condition (i) says that every matching in an absorbing set is (directly or
indirectly) dominated by any other matching in the same set. Condition (ii) no
matching in an absorbing set is directly dominated by a matching outside that
set.
19Klaus et al. [21] prove that only the matchings in absorbing sets are stochastically stable.
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The following remark states some properties of absorbing sets and their
matchings.
Remark 7 (i) Absorbing sets satisfy the property of outer stability, which re-
quires that every matching not belonging to an absorbing set is (indirectly) dom-
inated by the matchings of an absorbing set (Kalai et al. [19]). (ii) Every
absorbing set contains a P-stable matchings but not all P-stable matchings be-
long to an absorbing sets (Inarra et al. [17]).
Next, consider the relationship between the Q-stable matchings and absorb-
ing sets. We find that not all Q-stable matchings belong to an absorbing set. In
Example 1 all matchings with at least one pair of agents are Q-stable, however,
matching µ1 = {{2}, {3}, {1, 4}} does not belong to unique absorbing set. To
see this let µ2 = {{2, 3}, {1, 4}}. It is immediate that µ2RTµ1 but not µ1RTµ2.
Hence condition 1 of the definition of absorbing set is not satisfied. However,
the matching provided by the algorithm belongs to an absorbing set.
Let P be a stable partition and denote by S1 the set of pairs of P and BY??
D1 = N\S1.
Claim 4 Let µ be a P-stable matching and let U = S1 \I Then µ′RTµ where µ′
is a matching such that µ′|U (ai) = ai for all ai ∈ U and µ′|N\U (aj) = µ|N\U (aj)
for all aj ∈ N \ U .
Proof. We show that there is a sequence of matchings from µ to µ′, in which
all pairs in µ|U become singles while the rest of agents are paired as in µ. Notice
that each pair in µ|U can be broken by (i) a single agent of an odd ring or (ii) an
agent in U who has previously become single. Consider the following iterative
process:
For t=1. Let U1 = {ai ∈ U : bj ai µ(ai) for some bj ∈ D1} and let M|P
be the set of P-stable matchings of P so that µ ∈ M|P . Thus, U1 is
the set of agents who block some matching in M|P with a single agent
of an odd ring of P.20 Note that U1 6= ∅ otherwise S1 = I and we are
done. Set µ = µ1 and consider {ai, ai+1} ∈ µ1|U1 such that bi ai ai+1
and ai bi bi with bi ∈ D1. W.l.o.g. assume that µ1(bi) = bi, otherwise
by Remark 4 there exists another matching µˆ ∈ M|P such that µˆRTµ1
20By definition of stable partition no agent in U prefers a singleton of the partition to her
partner in the partition and therefore this type of pairs cannot block any P-stable matching.
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and µˆ(bi) = bi. Matching µ
1 is blocked by {ai, bi} forming matching µ11
in which µ11(ai+1) = ai+1. By the stability of partition P, bi−1 bi ai
and bi bi−1 µ1(bi−1) = bi−2. Thus, matching µ11 is blocked by {bi−1, bi}
forming matching µ12 in which µ
1
2(ai) = ai and µ
1
2(ai+1) = ai+1. We
repeat this step for all pairs in µ|U1 until their agents become singles.21
Hence, we achieve a matching µ1k such that µ
1
k(ai) = ai for all ai ∈ U1 and
µ1k(aj) = µ
1(aj) for all aj ∈ N \ U1 and µ1kRTµ1. Then go to next step.
For t¿1. Let µt−1l be the matching obtained at the end of Step t− 1 such that
µt−1l R
Tµ. Set µt−1l = µ
t. Let Ut = {ai ∈ U : aj ai µ(ai) for some aj ∈
Ut−1}. If Ut = ∅ then µt = µ′ and we are done. Otherwise there is a pair
{al, al+1} ∈ µ|U\Ut−1 where U t−1 =
⋃t−1
i=1 Ui such that at al al+1 and
al at at for some at ∈ U t−1. Then matching µt is blocked by {al, at}
forming a new matching µt1 in which µ
t(al+1) = al+1. By the stability of
partition P, µ(at) = at−1 at al and at at−1 at−1 so that µt1 is blocked by
pair {at, at−1} forming matching µt2 in which µt2(al) = al, µt2(al+1) = al+1
and µt2(at) = at−1. Thus, pair {at, at−1} has been formed again and we
need to split it. Suppose that at−1 and at become singles for first time at
Step j, then repeat the reasoning followed backwards from Step j until we
reach a matching in which all agents in U t−1∪{al, al+1} are alone, and the
remaining agents are paired as in µ. Then iterate this step for all pairs in
µ|Ut until all agents in U t = Ut ∪U t−1 become singles. Hence, we achieve
a matching µtm such that µ
t
m(ai) = ai for all ai ∈ U t and µtm(aj) = µ(aj)
for all aj ∈ N\U t and µtmRTµ. Then increase t and repeat this step.
Since the number of agents in U is finite, the process finishes in finite time.
Proposition 7 The Q∗-stable matching obtained as the output of the algorithm
belongs to an absorbing set.
Proof. Let µ∗ be the resulting matching of the algorithm. Assume that µ∗
does not belong to an absorbing set. By Remark 7 and from the definition of
absorbing set there exists a P-stable matching µ in an absorbing set A such
that µRTµ∗ but not µ∗RTµ.
21Remark 4 can be extended to any set of matchings such that the agents in the odd rings
are paired as in the set of P-stable matchings and the rest of agents are paired equally in all
matchings in the set.
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Since µRTµ∗ then µ∗I = µI since µ
∗
I is a maximum irreversible set of pairs.
By Remark 1 µ∗|N\U = µ|N\U , hence µ∗|U 6= µ|U otherwise µ and µ∗ coincide.
By Claim 4 µ′RTµ such that µ′(ai) = ai for all ai ∈ U and µ′(aj) = µ(aj)
for all aj ∈ N \ U . But since µ∗(ai)  ai for all ai ∈ U , then it is easy to see
that µ∗(ai)RTµ′RTµ, contradicting the initial assumption.
Remark 8 Every matching formed by joining mutually acceptable unmatched
agents in a Q∗-stable matching belongs to an absorbing set.
5 Discussion: Q-stability for hedonic games
To conclude we discuss some problems that share with the roommate problem
the lack of stable outcomes and where the extension of Q-stable matchings to
these setups can generate a good candidate as solution. The first problem we
consider is the most natural extension of the roommate problem, the so called
hedonic games introduced by Dre´ze and Greenberg ??.
Consider a hedonic game (N, (i)i∈N ) where N is the finite set of players,
and i is a complete and transitive preference relation on subsets of agents that
include agent i. A set S ⊆ N is called a coalition. Let Si(N) = {S ⊆ N : i ∈ S}
the set of coalitions that contain agent i. A coalition structure S on N is
a partition of N into disjoint coalitions. We denote the set of all coalition
structures by P. Let S(i,S) be a coalition in S that contains agent i. Given
T ⊆ N and S ∈ P such that ⋃i∈T S(i,S) = T , we denote S|T the coalition
structure on T .
A coalition structure S is stable if for every S′ ⊆ N there exists an agent
i ∈ S′ such that S(i,S) i S′.
It is well-known that for hedonic games a stable coalition structure may not
exist. To cope with this lack of stability we propose Q-stable coalition structures
as a solution. Thus, in this setting we introduce the following concepts.
Definition 6 (i) A set of agents T form an irreversible set of (disjoint) coali-
tions S|T if for all S′ with S′ ∩ T 6= ∅ there exists an agent i ∈ T such that
S(i,S|T ) i S′. (ii) A coalitional structure is maximum irreversible if it con-
tainsan an irreversible set of the largest possible size.
Definition 7 (i) A set of agents T form an internally stable set of (disjoint)
coalitions S|T if for every coalition S′ ⊆ T there exists and agent i ∈ S′ such
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that S(i,S|T ) i S′. (ii) A coalitional structure is maximum internally stable
if it contains an internally stable set of the largest possible size.
The intersection of maximum irreversible coalition structures and maximum
internally stable coalition structures determine the Q-stable matchings of these
problems. Formally,
Definition 8 A coalition structure is Q-stable if it is maximum internally stable
and maximum irreversible.
Example 6 Consider the following 7-agent problem, where we only take into
account those coalitions in which all its members prefer to form such coalitions
to be single:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
{1, 2} {2, 3} {1, 3, 4} {1, 3, 4} {5, 6, 7} {5, 6} {5, 7}
{1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 7} {2, 3} {1, 4} {5, 6} {5, 6, 7} {6, 7}
{1, 4} {2, 4} {2, 3, 7} {2, 4} {5, 7} {1, 6} {5, 6, 7}
{1, 7} {1, 2} {6, 7} {2, 3, 7}
In this hedonic game there is no stable coalition structure, since agents 1, 2,
3 and 4 cannot be partitioned in a stable manner. Any partition containing
{1, 2} is blocked by coalitions {2, 3} and {2, 4}. Any partition containing {2, 3}
or {2, 4} is blocked by coalition {1, 3, 4} and any partition containing {1, 3, 4} is
blocked by {1, 2}. On the one hand, the maximum irreversible set of coalitions is
S|T = {{5, 6, 7}}. On the other hand, the set of agents V = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} form
a maximum internally stable set of coalitions S|V = {{1, 3, 4}, {5, 6, 7}}. There-
fore the unique Q-stable coalition structure is S∗ = {{2}, {1, 3, 4}, {5, 6, 7}}.
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6 Appendix22
Since the notion of stable partition plays a significant role in the current work
and his interpretation is not that easy, we present informally this algorithm
described as an acceptance-rejection procedure, which is illustrated with a nu-
merical example, and then we give its formal definition.
Let (N,) be a problem where N = {a1, ..., an} is the set of agents. Let
(Nk, ()k) be the restricted problem where Nk = {a1, ..., ak} and ()k is the
preference list of agents in Nk in which N\Nk agents have been deleted. As-
sume that we have already found a stable partition, say Pk, a for (Nk, ()k) ,
1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 and that one additional agent ak+1 is added. The question is
whether a stable partition Pk+1 for the enlarged problem (Nk+1, ()k+1) can
be determined. The answer in in the affirmative. The following acceptance-
rejection procedure determines it:
Let problem (Nk, ()k) and let ak+1 be the newcomer. By embedding agent
ak+1 into the existent lists and adding her own list to problem (Nk, ()k),
problem (Nk+1, ()k+1) is constructed. (Note that {a1} is the unique stable
partition for (N1, ()1)). Given a stable partition Pk for (Nk, ()k) let agent
ak+1 propose to the set of agents in Nk according to her preference order:
1. If nobody accepts her proposal, then ak+1 is alone and stable partition
Pk+1 = Pk ∪ {ak} is obtained.
2. If ak+1 is accepted by agent x there are three possible cases:
(i) If x is unmatched in Pk then Pk+1 = (Pk\{x}) ∪ {x, ak+1} and stable
partition P\k+1 for (Nk+1, ()k+1 is obtained.
(ii) If x is currently in an odd ring, say (a1, a2, ..., a2m, x), then the arrival of
ak+1 decomposes the set into pairs and Pk+1 = {{a1, a2}, {a3, a4}....{a2m−1, a2m}}∪
{{ak+1, x}} becomes a stable partition for (Nk+1, ()k+1.
(iii) If x is in a mutually aceptable pair say {x, y} in Pk then y becomes single
ans is the new proposer. In this phase a proposal-rejection sequence takes
place which may stops in 1 in 2 (i) or 2 (ii). In both cases the desired
stable partition comes out. Otherwise an agent who made a proposal once
22The content of this appendix follows Section 4.3 in Manlove [23]. (See this section for a
detailed analysis)
27
receives a proposal later and repetition takes place. Then stop. All agents
involved in the cycle form a set and stable partition Pk+1 for problem
(Nk+1, ()k+1) is constructed.
Example 7 Consider the following 7-agent problem:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
a3 a1 a4 a2 a6 a7 a5
a2 a4 a2 a5 a4 a5 a6
a4 a3 a1 a3 a7 a2 a1
a5 a6 a7 a7 a2 a3 a2
a6 a7 a5 a6 a3 a1 a3
a7 a5 a6 a1 a1 a4 a4
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
W.l.o.g assume that agents arrive to the process in the following arbitrary order:
a1, a2, a3, ..., a7.
• a1 arrives and forms a stable partition {a1} for (N1, ()1).
• a2 arrives and proposes to a1. Since a1 rather matches a2 than being
alone, accepts the proposal and {a1, a2} is stable partition for (N2, ()2)
(see Case 2 (i)).
• a3 arrives and proposes to a2 who rejects then proposes to a1 who accepts.
Pair {a1, a3} forms and a2, now alone, proposes to a1 who rejects and
then to a3 who accepts. Pair {a2, a3} and a1 is abandoned. This agent
proposes a3 who rejects and then to a2 who accepts and pair {a1, a2} is
formed and a3 is a proposer again. The cycling agents get together in the
set {a1, a2, a3} and stable partition {{a1, a2, a3}} for (N3, ()3) is obtained
(see Case 2 (iii)).
• a4 arrives and proposes to a2 who accepts. Stable partition {{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}}
for (N4, ()4) is obtained (see Case 2 (ii)).
• a5 arrives and is rejected for all agents in the process. Hence stable
partition{{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}, {a5}} for (N5, ()5) is obtained. (See Case
1)
• a6 arrives and proposes to a5 who accepts. Stable partition {{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}, {a5, a6}}
for (N6, ()6) is obtained (see Case 2 (i)).
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• a7 arrives and proposes to a5 who rejects, then to a6 who acepts and form:
{{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}, {a6, a7}{a5}}. a5 proposes to a4 who rejects and then
to a7 who accepts forming {{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}, {a5, a7}{a6}}. a6 proposes to
a7 who rejects and to a5 who accepts forming {{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}, {a6, a7}{a5}}.
Then a5 proposes to a6 who rejects, then to a4 who also rejects and then
to a7 who accepts forming {{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}, {a5, a6}{a7}} and we reach
a cycle. The cycling agents get together {a5, a6, a7} and stable partition
{{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}, {a5, a6, a7}} for (N7, ()7) = (N, ()) is obtained for
(see Case 2 (iii))
The outcome is stable by construction: there is not a pair of agents be-
longing to different sets or within a set who block the stable partition.
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